A characterization of the uniform rule with several commodities and agents

@article{Morimoto2013ACO,
  title={A characterization of the uniform rule with several commodities and agents},
  author={Shuhei Morimoto and Shigehiro Serizawa and Stephen Ching},
  journal={Social Choice and Welfare},
  year={2013},
  volume={40},
  pages={871-911}
}
We consider the problem of allocating infinitely divisible commodities among a group of agents. Especially, we focus on the case where there are several commodities to be allocated, and agents have continuous, strictly convex, and separable preferences. In this paper, we establish that the uniform rule is the only rule satisfying strategy-proofness, unanimity, symmetry, and nonbossiness. 

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