Corpus ID: 55775170

A Voting Approach to Externality Problems

@article{Anderson2011AVA,
  title={A Voting Approach to Externality Problems},
  author={David A. Anderson},
  journal={Journal of economic and social policy},
  year={2011},
  volume={14},
  pages={50}
}
Externality problems endure despite elegant solutions put forward by myriad scholars. The approaches of Arthur Pigou, Ronald Coase, Garret Hardin and others face binding constraints in theory and in practice, and alternative remedies are needed to address lingering inefficiencies. Although voting is generally not a consistent source of efficient decisions, this article describes a broad class of externality problems for which voting brings individuals to internalize external costs and choose… Expand
2 Citations
Environmental Exigencies and the Efficient Voter Rule
Externality problems hinder solutions to existential threats, including climate change and mass extinction. To avert environmental crises, policymakers seek mechanisms that align private incentivesExpand

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