A Third Way in Metaethics

@article{Schroeter2009ATW,
  title={A Third Way in Metaethics},
  author={Laura Schroeter and F. Schroeter},
  journal={No{\^u}s},
  year={2009},
  volume={43},
  pages={1-30}
}
What does it take to count as competent with the meaning of a thin evaluative predicate like ‘is the right thing to do’? According to minimalists like Allan Gibbard and Ralph Wedgwood, competent speakers must simply use the predicate to express their own motivational states. According to analytic descriptivists like Frank Jackson, Philip Pettit and Christopher Peacocke, competent speakers must grasp a particular criterion for identifying the property picked out by the term. Both approaches face… Expand
27 Citations
Analyticity and the Deviant Logician: Williamson’s Argument from Disagreement
  • 1
  • PDF
Conceptual change in perspective
Why Be an Anti‐Individualist?
  • 25
Bootstrapping our way to samesaying
  • 29
Defending moral particularism
  • 1
  • PDF
...
1
2
3
...

References

SHOWING 1-10 OF 15 REFERENCES
Conceptual Role Semantics for Moral Terms
  • 86
MORAL FUNCTIONALISM AND MORAL MOTIVATION
  • 115
  • PDF
Cognitivism, A Priori Deduction, and Moore*
  • 20
Why Be an Anti‐Individualist?
  • 25
Masters of Our Meanings
  • 23
Against a priori reductions
  • 11
Conceptual analysis and reductive explanation
  • 381
  • PDF
Why We Need A-Intensions
  • 46
...
1
2
...