A Theory of Joint Ownership

@inproceedings{Halonen1997ATO,
  title={A Theory of Joint Ownership},
  author={Maija Halonen},
  year={1997}
}
We show that joint ownership (partnership or joint venture) can implement Þrst best in a twice repeated game when each agent believes that the other party is honest with a very small probability. In the Þnal period the ownership structure is renegotiated because joint ownership is ex post inefficient. If an agent has cheated her outside option is very low since by cheating she has lost her reputation — while an unrevealed agent has a much higher outside option. Therefore in renegotiation most… CONTINUE READING

From This Paper

Figures, tables, and topics from this paper.

References

Publications referenced by this paper.
Showing 1-10 of 13 references

Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure (Clarendon Press, Oxford)

  • O. HART
  • 1995
Highly Influential
5 Excerpts

”Building a Relationship”, mimeo

  • J. WATSON
  • 1996
Highly Influential
3 Excerpts

”Investment and Wages in the Absence of Binding Contracts: A Nash Bargaining Approach”

  • P. A. GROUT
  • 1984
Highly Influential
4 Excerpts

”Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study”

  • S. MACAULAY
  • American Sociological Review,
  • 1963
Highly Influential
3 Excerpts

”Does Asset Ownership Always Motivate Managers? The Property Rights Theory of the Firm with Alternating-Offers Bargaining”, mimeo

  • D. DE MEZA
  • LOCKWOOD,
  • 1996

”Implicit Contracts and the Theory of the Firm”, mimeo

  • G. BAKER, K. R. GIBBONS
  • MURPHY,
  • 1995
1 Excerpt

”Why Reputation Favors Joint Ventures over Vertical and Horizontal Integration: A Simple Model”

  • G. T. GARVEY
  • Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization,
  • 1995
2 Excerpts

”Incomplete Contracts, Vertical Integration, and Supply Constraints”

  • P. BOLTON, M.D
  • WHINSTON,
  • 1993

”Moral Hazard in Teams”

  • B. HOLMSTRÖM
  • Bell Journal of Economics,
  • 1982
1 Excerpt

Similar Papers

Loading similar papers…