• Corpus ID: 15873823

A Theory of Civil Disobedience Faculty Research Working Paper Series

@inproceedings{Glaeser2015ATO,
  title={A Theory of Civil Disobedience Faculty Research Working Paper Series},
  author={Edward L. Glaeser},
  year={2015}
}
From the streets of Hong Kong to Ferguson, Missouri, civil disobedience has again become newsworthy. What explains the prevalence and extremity of acts of civil disobedience? This paper presents a model in which protest planners choose the nature of the disturbance hoping to influence voters (or other decision-makers in less democratic regimes) both through the size of the unrest and by generating a response. The model suggests that protesters will either choose a mild “epsilon” protest, such… 

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By the people: : Rebuilding liberty without permission