A Test of the Structure of PAC Contracts: An Analysis of House Gun Control Votes in the 1980s

  title={A Test of the Structure of PAC Contracts: An Analysis of House Gun Control Votes in the 1980s},
  author={Joseph P. McGarrity and Daniel Sutter},
  journal={Southern Economic Journal},
We examine roll call votes on gun control in the U.S. House of Representatives during the 1980s to determine whether political action committees (PACs) make spot market purchases, prepay for votes in the prior election cycle, or make long-term investments. Previous tests generally employ PAC contributions from only one cycle, which could impose the wrong structure on contracts between PACs and politicians, causing researchers to misestimate a contribution’s impact. We find that money from more… 
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