A Tangled Mass: The Android Root Certificate Stores

  title={A Tangled Mass: The Android Root Certificate Stores},
  author={Narseo Vallina-Rodriguez and Johanna Amann and Christian Kreibich and Nicholas Weaver and Vern Paxson},
The security of today's Web rests in part on the set of X.509 certificate authorities trusted by each user's browser. Users generally do not themselves configure their browser's root store but instead rely upon decisions made by the suppliers of either the browsers or the devices upon which they run. In this work we explore the nature and implications of these trust decisions for Android users. Drawing upon datasets collected by Netalyzr for Android and ICSI's Certificate Notary, we… CONTINUE READING
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