A Tale of Two Mechanisms: Student Placement

  title={A Tale of Two Mechanisms: Student Placement},
  author={M. Balinski and T. S{\"o}nmez},
  journal={Journal of Economic Theory},
  • M. Balinski, T. Sönmez
  • Published 1999
  • Economics
  • Journal of Economic Theory
  • Abstract A new class of matching problems that models centralized college admissions via standardized tests is presented. The allocation mechanism that is used in real-life applications of this problem in Turkey is analyzed. It is shown that this mechanism, multi-category serial dictatorship, has a number of serious deficiencies, most notably inefficiency, vulnerability to manipulation, and the potential of penalizing students for improved test scores. Exploiting the relation between this class… CONTINUE READING
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