A Tale of Two Epistemologies?

@article{Hjek2017ATO,
  title={A Tale of Two Epistemologies?},
  author={Alan H{\'a}jek and Hanti Lin},
  journal={Res Philosophica},
  year={2017}
}
So-called “traditional epistemology” and “Bayesian epistemology” share a word, but it may often seem that the enterprises hardly share a subject matter. They differ in their central concepts. They differ in their main concerns. They differ in their main theoretical moves. And they often differ in their methodology. However, in the last decade or so, there have been a number of attempts to build bridges between the two epistemologies. Indeed, many would say that there is just one branch of… 

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