A Synergy of Institutional Incentives and Networked Structures in Evolutionary Game Dynamics of Multi-agent Systems

@article{Lim2021ASO,
  title={A Synergy of Institutional Incentives and Networked Structures in Evolutionary Game Dynamics of Multi-agent Systems},
  author={Ik Soo Lim and Valerio Capraro},
  journal={ArXiv},
  year={2021},
  volume={abs/2112.03112}
}
Understanding the emergence of prosocial behaviours (e.g., cooperation and trust) among self-interested agents is an important problem in many disciplines. Network structure and institutional incentives (e.g., punishing antisocial agents) are known to promote prosocial behaviours, when acting in isolation, one mechanism being present at a time. Here we study the interplay between these two mechanisms to see whether they are independent, interfering or synergetic. Using evolutionary game theory… 
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