A Survey of non-Prioritized Belief Revision

  title={A Survey of non-Prioritized Belief Revision},
  author={Sven Ove Hansson},
  • S. Hansson
  • Published 1 May 1999
  • Philosophy, Economics
  • Erkenntnis
This paper summarizes and systematizes recent and ongoing work on non-prioritized belief change, i.e., belief revision in which the new information has no special priority due to its novelty. 
On Non-Prioritized Multiple Belief Revision
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Accommodative Belief Revision
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A negotiation-style framework for non-prioritised revision
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(dis)belief Change and Argued Feed-back Dialog
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Trust-based belief change
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Selective revision with multiple informants and argumentative support
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A Semantic Approach to Non-prioritized Belief Revision
This manuscript presents a semantic approach to non-prioritized belief revision that uses plausibility models for depicting an agent’s beliefs, and model operations for displaying the way beliefs change.
On the Logic of Iterated Non-prioritised Revision
These postulates generalise some of those which have previously been proposed for iterated AGM (“prioritised”) revision, including those of Darwiche and Pearl, and add a second type of revision operation which allows the core itself to be revised.
On Limited Non-Prioritised Belief Revision Operators with Dynamic Scope
The concept of dynamic-limited revision, which are revisions expressible by a total preorder over a limited set of worlds, is introduced and presented, which leads to revision operators which are inherence-limited, and a representation theorem is presented for these operators.


An Essay on Contraction
Theories and theory change, revision, merge and inference, Everything in flux: dynamic ontologies, is published.
On the Logic of Theory Change: Partial Meet Contraction and Revision Functions
The authors investigate "partial meet contraction functions", which are defined to yield the intersection of some nonempty family of maximal subsets of the theory that fail to imply the proposition being eliminated, and basic properties of these functions are established.
The Logic of Theory Change
The logic of theory change is one of the literary work in this world in suitable to be reading material and this book gives reference, but also it will show the amazing benefits of reading a book.
Belief base dynamics
Knowledge in Flux
Two modellings for theory change
Revisions of Knowledge Systems Using Epistemic Entrenchment
A representation theorem is proved which says that a revision method for a knowledge system satisfies the set of rationality postulates, if and only if, there exists an ordering of epistemic entrenchment satisfying the appropriate constraints such that this ordering determines the retraction priority of the facts of the knowledge system.