A Survey of Microarchitectural Side-channel Vulnerabilities, Attacks, and Defenses in Cryptography

  title={A Survey of Microarchitectural Side-channel Vulnerabilities, Attacks, and Defenses in Cryptography},
  author={Xiaoxuan Lou and Tianwei Zhang and Jun Jiang and Yinqian Zhang},
  journal={ACM Computing Surveys (CSUR)},
  pages={1 - 37}
Side-channel attacks have become a severe threat to the confidentiality of computer applications and systems. One popular type of such attacks is the microarchitectural attack, where the adversary exploits the hardware features to break the protection enforced by the operating system and steal the secrets from the program. In this article, we systematize microarchitectural side channels with a focus on attacks and defenses in cryptographic applications. We make three contributions. (1) We… 

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