A Strictly Evolutionary Model of Common Law

  title={A Strictly Evolutionary Model of Common Law},
  author={R. Peter Terrebonne},
  journal={The Journal of Legal Studies},
  pages={397 - 407}
  • R. Terrebonne
  • Published 1 June 1981
  • Law
  • The Journal of Legal Studies
PAUL H. Rubin and George L. Priest have developed similar models to argue that the common law evolves largely independently of the desires of individual judges and that this evolutionary process favors the selection of rules that promote economic efficiency.' The central assumption of both authors was that rules that are litigated most often have the greatest probability of being overturned.2 Rubin pointed out that, when litigants have a continuing interest in the legal rules involved in… 
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