• Published 2001

A Strategic Rationale for Imperfect Pro ... t Measures

@inproceedings{Zitzewitz2001ASR,
  title={A Strategic Rationale for Imperfect Pro ... t Measures},
  author={Eric Zitzewitz},
  year={2001}
}
In models by Fershtman and Judd (1987) and Sklivas (1987), ...rms competing in quantities bene...t strategically from commiting to managerial incentives that are biased toward revenue maximization. Little empirical evidence has been produced in support of these models, and their assumption that incentive contracts are observable has been criticized as unrealistic. This paper proposes an alternative model in which ...rms competing in strategic substitutes commit to using less precise pro...t… CONTINUE READING

References

Publications referenced by this paper.
SHOWING 1-10 OF 41 REFERENCES