A Solution Concept for Majority Rule in Dynamic Settings

@article{Bernheim2007ASC,
  title={A Solution Concept for Majority Rule in Dynamic Settings},
  author={B. Bernheim and S. Slavov},
  journal={ERN: Stochastic \& Dynamic Games (Topic)},
  year={2007}
}
We define and explore the notion of a Dynamic Condorcet Winner (DCW), which extends the notion of a Condorcet winner to dynamic settings. We show that, for every DCW, every member of a large class of dynamic majoritarian games has an equivalent equilibrium, and that other equilibria are not similarly portable across this class of games. Existence of DCWs is guaranteed when members of the community are sufficiently patient. We characterize sustainable and unsustainable outcomes, study the… Expand
Condorcet cycles? A model of intertemporal voting
One-deviation principle and endogenous political choice
Conventions and Coalitions in Repeated Games
Compromises and Rewards: stable and non-manipulable probabilistic matching
Voting in Collective Stopping Games
...
1
2
3
4
5
...

References

SHOWING 1-10 OF 50 REFERENCES
Condorcet cycles? A model of intertemporal voting
Towards a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring
Repeated Downsian electoral competition
On a Class of Equilibrium Conditions for Majority Rule
Dynamic Cooperative Games
...
1
2
3
4
5
...