# A Smooth Transition from Powerlessness to Absolute Power

@article{Mossel2012AST, title={A Smooth Transition from Powerlessness to Absolute Power}, author={Elchanan Mossel and Ariel D. Procaccia and Mikl{\'o}s Z. R{\'a}cz}, journal={ArXiv}, year={2012}, volume={abs/1205.2074} }

We study the phase transition of the coalitional manipulation problem for generalized scoring rules. Previously it has been shown that, under some conditions on the distribution of votes, if the number of manipulators is o (√n), where n is the number of voters, then the probability that a random profile is manipulable by the coalition goes to zero as the number of voters goes to infinity, whereas if the number of manipulators is ω(√n), then the probability that a random profile is manipulable… CONTINUE READING

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