A Skeptical View on the Physics-Consciousness Explanatory Gap

@article{MartinezSaito2021ASV,
  title={A Skeptical View on the Physics-Consciousness Explanatory Gap},
  author={Mario Martinez-Saito},
  journal={Axiomathes},
  year={2021},
  pages={1-30}
}
The epistemological chasm between how we (implicitly and subjectively) perceive or imagine the actual world and how we (explicitly and “objectively”) think of its underlying entities has motivated perhaps the most disconcerting impasse in human thought: the explanatory gap between the phenomenal and physical properties of the world. Here, I advocate a combination of philosophical skepticism and simplicity as an informed approach to arbitrate among theories of consciousness. I argue that the… 
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