A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for an Additive Buyer

@article{Babaioff2014ASA,
title={A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for an Additive Buyer},
author={Moshe Babaioff and Nicole Immorlica and B. Lucier and S. Weinberg},
journal={2014 IEEE 55th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science},
year={2014},
pages={21-30}
}

2014 IEEE 55th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science

We consider a monopolist seller with n heterogeneous items, facing a single buyer. The buyer hasa value for each item drawn independently according to(non-identical) distributions, and his value for a set ofitems is additive. The seller aims to maximize his revenue.It is known that an optimal mechanism in this setting maybe quite complex, requiring randomization [19] and menusof infinite size [15]. Hart and Nisan [17] have initiated astudy of two very simple pricing schemes for this settingâ€¦Â Expand