A Role for Judgment Aggregation in Coauthoring Scientific Papers

@article{Bright2018ARF,
  title={A Role for Judgment Aggregation in Coauthoring Scientific Papers},
  author={Liam Kofi Bright and Haixin Dang and Remco Heesen},
  journal={Erkenntnis},
  year={2018},
  volume={83},
  pages={231-252}
}
Abstract This paper addresses the problem of judgment aggregation in science. How should scientists decide which propositions to assert in a collaborative document? We distinguish the question of what to write in a collaborative document from the question of collective belief. We argue that recent objections to the application of the formal literature on judgment aggregation to the problem of judgment aggregation in science apply to the latter, not the former question. The formal literature has… 
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