A Quantitative Analysis of Multi-Winner Rules

@article{Lackner2019AQA,
  title={A Quantitative Analysis of Multi-Winner Rules},
  author={Martin Lackner and Piotr Skowron},
  journal={ArXiv},
  year={2019},
  volume={abs/1801.01527}
}
To choose a suitable multi-winner voting rule is a hard and ambiguous task. Depending on the context, it varies widely what constitutes the choice of an "optimal" subset.In this paper, we offer a new perspective on measuring the quality of such subsets and---consequently---of multi-winner rules. We provide a quantitative analysis using methods from the theory of approximation algorithms and estimate how well multi-winner rules approximate two extreme objectives: diversity as captured by the… 

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