• DOI:10.1111/j.1749-6632.1981.tb51134.x
• Corpus ID: 86711656

A QUANTUM MODEL OF DOUBT *

@article{Orlov1981AQM,
  title={A QUANTUM MODEL OF DOUBT *},
  author={Yuri F. Orlov},
  journal={Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences},
  year={1981},
  volume={373}
}

• Y. Orlov
• Published 1 October 1981
• Philosophy
• Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences

Doubt in the correctness of a proposition is a component of the process of thinking. Since this process is, to a considerable extent, unconscious, it is natural to assume that the phenomenon of doubt already exists on a subconscious level. In a “subconscious” state, we are aware of the presence of doubt, but it is not yet formulated as a proposition. In such a state, we are able in some form to fix the presence of doubt. Then we can realize, with some effort, that this fixation has taken place. Thus, each ascending stage of self-consciousness requires ever greater effort. In accordance with this scheme, I formulate the following-in the present paper only qualitativeassumption: there are different levels ofronsciousness. Each level of this hierarchical system is “consciousness,” in the narrow sense of the word, for the lower levels, and “subconsciousness” for the upper levels. The process of self-consciousness involves the stimulation of ever higher levels of consciousness. If, a t a given level, some logical system is used, then the operations performed at the next level up will purport to justify the postulates of this logical system. The transition from a given level to the next higher level is what V. F. Turchin calls “a metasystem transition.”’ When a conflict occurs a t a given level of consciousness, an arbitration a t a higher level becomes necessary. Specifically, we speak of a conflict i f ( 1 ) a decision must be taken, (2) there are different viewpoints about how to cope with the situation, (3) different points of view lead to different and incompatible commands, and (4) the incompatibility of the points of view cannot be resolved at this level, rendering decision making impossible. There exist situations where the reason a decision cannot be taken is not that there are too many points of view, but, on the contrary, that there are too few. In such cases we will say that the logical system has insufficient resolving power. In the simplest case, the ultimate reason may be that insufficient information has been received from the sensor organs. Or it may be that the question is such that it is intrinsically impossible to select one “true” criterion (e.g.. truth, beauty, or morality) from an irreducible set of criteria, that i t is a matter of the personal convictions of the individual. If the individual is still obliged to make some decision in the case of insufficient resolving power, the resulting state will be called, by definition, a doubt state. The actual decision in this situation will be taken by a spontaneous (non-logical) act of will-by a free choice. It is also possible in this situation that there exist several mutually incompatible approaches, which make up incompatible logical subsystems of the full logical system