Corpus ID: 7314939

A Protectionist Bias in Majoritarian Politics ∗ by Gene

  title={A Protectionist Bias in Majoritarian Politics ∗ by Gene},
  author={Maxine Grossman},
  • Maxine Grossman
  • Published 2004
  • We develop a novel model of campaigns, elections, and policymaking in which the ex ante objectives of national party leaders differ from the ex post objectives of elected legislators. This generates a distinction between “policy rhetoric” and “policy reality” and introduces an important role for “party discipline” in the policymaking process. We identify a protectionist bias in majoritarian politics. When trade policy is chosen by the majority delegation and legislators in the minority have… CONTINUE READING

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