A Problem with Referendums

@article{Lacy2000APW,
  title={A Problem with Referendums},
  author={Dean Lacy and Emerson M. S. Niou},
  journal={Journal of Theoretical Politics},
  year={2000},
  volume={12},
  pages={31 - 5}
}
When some voters have nonseparable preferences across multiple binary issues, majority rule may not select a Condorcet winning set of outcomes when one exists, and the social choice may be a Condorcet loser or Pareto-dominated by every other set of outcomes. We present an empirical example of one such paradox from voting on the Internet. We evaluate potential solutions to the problem of nonseparable preferences in referendums, including set-wise voting, sequential voting, and vote-trading… 

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