A Principal-Agent Approach to Transmission Expansion—Part I: Regulatory Framework

@article{Molina2013APA,
  title={A Principal-Agent Approach to Transmission Expansion—Part I: Regulatory Framework},
  author={J. Molina and J. Contreras and H. Rudnick},
  journal={IEEE Transactions on Power Systems},
  year={2013},
  volume={28},
  pages={256-263}
}
  • J. Molina, J. Contreras, H. Rudnick
  • Published 2013
  • Economics
  • IEEE Transactions on Power Systems
  • Different regulatory frameworks have implemented competitive mechanisms to increase efficiency in transmission, a natural monopoly. Conflicts of interest and hidden costs make necessary to define methods to obtain an appropriate valuation of new transmission assets. This paper is the first one of a two-paper series and presents the fundamentals of transmission project valuation and cost allocation. We show the fundamentals of non-cooperative game theory, different concepts of game equilibria… CONTINUE READING
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