• Corpus ID: 49552715

A Predictable Incentive Mechanism for TrueBit

  title={A Predictable Incentive Mechanism for TrueBit},
  author={Julia Koch and Christian Reitwie{\ss}ner},
TrueBit is a protocol that uses interactive verification to allow a resource-constrained computation environment like a blockchain to perform much larger computations than usual in a trusted way. As long as a single honest participant is present to verify the computation, an invalid computation cannot get accepted. In TrueBit, the presence of such a verifier is incentivised by randomly injected forced errors. Additionally, in order to counter sybil attacks, the reward for finding an error… 

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