A Practical Guide to the Combinatorial Clock Auction
@article{Ausubel2017APG, title={A Practical Guide to the Combinatorial Clock Auction}, author={Lawrence M. Ausubel and O. Baranov}, journal={Wiley-Blackwell: Economic Journal}, year={2017} }
The combinatorial clock auction (CCA) is an important recent innovation in auction design that has been utilised for many spectrum auctions worldwide. While the theoretical foundations of the CCA are described in a growing literature, many of the practical implementation choices are neglected. In this article, we examine some of the most critical practical decisions for a regulator implementing the CCA. Topics include: implementation of reserve prices; endogenous band plans; supplementary round… CONTINUE READING
Paper Mentions
33 Citations
Combinatorial clock auctions: Price direction and performance
- Economics, Computer Science
- Games Econ. Behav.
- 2019
- 1
- PDF
Spiteful bidding and gaming in combinatorial clock auctions
- Business, Computer Science
- Games Econ. Behav.
- 2016
- 6
- PDF
A Bayesian Clearing Mechanism for Combinatorial Auctions
- Computer Science, Mathematics
- AAAI
- 2018
- 7
- Highly Influenced
- PDF
Revealed-Preference Activity Rule in Combinatorial Clock Spectrum Auction: A Review and New Research Opportunities
- Computer Science
- 2018 Third International Conference on Informatics and Computing (ICIC)
- 2018
The Combinatorial Clock Auction: the Effects of Strategic Behaviour and the Price Increment Rule on Social Welfare
- Economics, Computer Science
- EC
- 2018
- 1
References
SHOWING 1-10 OF 19 REFERENCES
Are Dynamic Vickrey Auctions Practical?: Properties of the Combinatorial Clock Auction
- Economics
- 2014
- 20
- PDF
Do core-selecting Combinatorial Clock Auctions always lead to high efficiency? An experimental analysis of spectrum auction designs
- Economics
- 2013
- 49
- PDF
Spiteful bidding and gaming in combinatorial clock auctions
- Business, Computer Science
- Games Econ. Behav.
- 2016
- 6
- PDF
Quadratic Core-Selecting Payment Rules for Combinatorial Auctions
- Economics, Computer Science
- Oper. Res.
- 2012
- 93
- Highly Influential
- PDF