A Posteriori Physicalists Get Our Phenomenal Concepts Wrong

  title={A Posteriori Physicalists Get Our Phenomenal Concepts Wrong},
  author={Philip K. Goff},
  journal={Australasian Journal of Philosophy},
  pages={191 - 209}
  • Philip K. Goff
  • Published 1 June 2011
  • Philosophy
  • Australasian Journal of Philosophy
Dualists say plausible things about our mental concepts: there is a way of thinking of pain, in terms of how it feels, which is independent of causal role. Physicalists make attractive ontological claims: the world is wholly physical. The attraction of a posteriori physicalism is that it has seemed to do both: to agree with the dualist about our mental concepts, whilst retaining a physicalist ontology. In this paper I argue that, in fact, a posteriori physicalism departs from the dualist's… 

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