A Posteriori Physicalism and Introspection

@article{Elpidorou2016APP,
  title={A Posteriori Physicalism and Introspection},
  author={Andreas Elpidorou},
  journal={Pacific Philosophical Quarterly},
  year={2016},
  volume={97},
  pages={474-500}
}
Introspection presents our phenomenal states in a manner otherwise than physical. This observation is often thought to amount to an argument against physicalism: if introspection presents phenomenal states as they essentially are, then phenomenal states cannot be physical states, for we are not introspectively aware of phenomenal states as physical states. In this article, I examine whether this argument threatens a posteriori physicalism. I argue that as along as proponents of a posteriori… 

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