• Corpus ID: 15847835

A Partial Identi cation Subnetwork Approach to Discrete Games in Large Networks : An Application to Quantifying Peer E ¤ ects

  title={A Partial Identi cation Subnetwork Approach to Discrete Games in Large Networks : An Application to Quantifying Peer E ¤ ects},
  author={Tong Li and Li Zhao and Peter Bearman and Kathleen Mullan Harris},
This paper studies identi…cation and estimation of discrete games in large networks, with an application to peer e¤ects on smoking in friend networks. Due to the presence of multiple equilibria, the model is not point identi…ed. We adopt the partial identi…cation approach by constructing moment inequalities on choice probabilities of subnetworks. Doing so not only signi…cantly reduces the computational cost, but also enables us to …nd consistent estimator of the moment conditions even when the… 

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