A Panenmentalist Reconsideration of the Identity of Indiscernibles

@inproceedings{Gilead2020APR,
  title={A Panenmentalist Reconsideration of the Identity of Indiscernibles},
  author={A. Gilead},
  year={2020}
}
If we consider any two entities (such as the two spheres in Max Black’s well-known thought-experiment) as individual possibilities, pure or actual, they cannot be considered indiscernible at all. Since allegedly indiscernible possibilities are necessarily one and the same possibility, any numerically distinct (at least two) possibilities must be discernible, independently of their properties, “monadic” or relational. Hence, any distinct possibility is also discernible. Metaphysically… Expand

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