• Corpus ID: 13344088

A Note on the computational hardness of evolutionary stable strategies

  title={A Note on the computational hardness of evolutionary stable strategies},
  author={Noam Nisan},
  journal={Electron. Colloquium Comput. Complex.},
  • N. Nisan
  • Published 2006
  • Mathematics
  • Electron. Colloquium Comput. Complex.
We present a very simple reduction that when given a graph G and an integer k produces a game that has an evolutionary stable strategy if and only if the maximum clique size of G is not exactly k. Formally this shows that existence of evolutionary stable strategies is hard for a complexity class called co − D, slightly strengthening (and greatly simplifying) the known NP-hardness and co-NP-hardness. En route we show that even recognizing an evolutionary stable strategy is co-NP complete. 

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Appendix: Rationality of x and

  • Appendix: Rationality of x and