A Note on the Post-Quantum Security of (Ring) Signatures

@inproceedings{Chatterjee2021ANO,
  title={A Note on the Post-Quantum Security of (Ring) Signatures},
  author={Rohit Chatterjee and Kai-Min Chung and Xiao Liang and Giulio Malavolta},
  booktitle={IACR Cryptol. ePrint Arch.},
  year={2021}
}
This work revisits the security of classical signatures and ring signatures in a quantum world. For (ordinary) signatures, we focus on the arguably preferable security notion of blind-unforgeability recently proposed by Alagic et al. (Eurocrypt’20). We present two short signature schemes achieving this notion: one is in the quantum random oracle model, assuming quantum hardness of SIS; and the other is in the plain model, assuming quantum hardness of LWE with super-polynomial modulus. Prior to… 

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