A Nonpragmatic Vindication of Probabilism

@article{Joyce1998ANV,
  title={A Nonpragmatic Vindication of Probabilism},
  author={Jaines M. Joyce},
  journal={Philosophy of Science},
  year={1998},
  volume={65},
  pages={575 - 603}
}
The pragmatic character of the Dutch book argument makes it unsuitable as an "epistemic" justification for the fundamental probabilist dogma that rational partial beliefs must conform to the axioms of probability. To secure an appropriately epistemic justification for this conclusion, one must explain what it means for a system of partial beliefs to accurately represent the state of the world, and then show that partial beliefs that violate the laws of probability are invariably less accurate… 

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