A New Perceptual Adverbialism

@article{DAmbrosio2019ANP,
  title={A New Perceptual Adverbialism},
  author={Justin D'Ambrosio},
  journal={The Journal of Philosophy},
  year={2019}
}
In this paper, I develop and defend a new adverbial theory of perception. I first present a semantics for direct-object perceptual reports that treats their object-positions as supplying adverbial modifiers, and I show how this semantics definitively solves the many-property problem for adverbialism. My solution is distinctive in that it articulates adverbialism from within a well-established formal semantic framework and ties adverbialism to a plausible semantics for perceptual reports in… 

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