• Corpus ID: 67815828

A New Monotonic and Clone-Independent Single-Winner Election Method

@inproceedings{Schulze2003ANM,
  title={A New Monotonic and Clone-Independent Single-Winner Election Method},
  author={Mark A. Schulze},
  year={2003}
}
In 1997, I proposed to a large number of people who are interested in mathematical aspects of election methods a new method that satisfies Pareto, monotonicity, resolvability, independence of clones, reversal symmetry, Smith-IIA, and Schwartz. This method immediately attracted a lot of attention and very many enthusiastic supporters. Today, this method is promoted e.g. by Diana Galletly [1], Mathew Goldstein [2], Jobst Heitzig [3], Raul Miller, Mike Ossipoff [4], Russ Paielli, Norman Petry… 
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