• Corpus ID: 55809266

A New Explanation of Arms Races in the Third World: A Differential Game Model

  title={A New Explanation of Arms Races in the Third World: A Differential Game Model},
  author={Cheng‐Te Lee},
This paper examines the stability of arms races in the Third World countries and assumes that the utility function is separable between the consumption and the weapon stocks. We find that the military expenditures and the weapon stocks will exhibit stability and overshooting takes place for the optimal control models. Moreover, we prove that the differential game model has an unstable equilibrium, a result opposite of Deger and Sen (1984). 

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