A New Cinderella Story: Joint Ventures and the Property Rights Theory of the Firm

  title={A New Cinderella Story: Joint Ventures and the Property Rights Theory of the Firm},
  author={Valeria Gattai and Piergiovanna Natale},
  journal={ERN: Other Econometrics: Mathematical Methods \& Programming (Topic)},
  • V. GattaiPiergiovanna Natale
  • Published 1 February 2017
  • Economics, Business
  • ERN: Other Econometrics: Mathematical Methods & Programming (Topic)
Joint ventures (JVs) are a common form of inter‐firm collaboration and, unsurprisingly, the subject of a vast literature, extending from economics to management and business studies. Issues of control are central to the definition of JVs, and this naturally calls for an interpretation in the context of the property rights theory (PRT) of the firm. In a series of seminal papers, Grossman, Hart and Moore (GHM) offer a rigorous framework to predict the allocation of control rights. Notably, under… 

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