A Neuroethological Framework for the Representation of Minds

@article{Brothers1992ANF,
  title={A Neuroethological Framework for the Representation of Minds},
  author={Leslie Brothers and Brian Ring},
  journal={Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience},
  year={1992},
  volume={4},
  pages={107-118}
}
The cognition that constructs mental features such as intention, disposition, and character is an aspect of theory of mind. This aspect of representation of minds, which inherently has valence, is viewed from cognitive, evolutionary, and neural perspectives. It is proposed that this cognition is modular, and that it normally operates in association with a valence-free cognition able to represent mental states such as belief. Examples of neural activity capable of supporting the social… 
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The Theory of Mind (ToM): theoretical, neurobiological and clinical profiles
  • G. Perrotta
  • Psychology
    Neuroscience and Neurological Surgery
  • 2020
The concept of "Theory of Mind" (ToM) is defined as the cognitive ability to represent one's own and others' mental states, in terms of thoughts and beliefs, but also of desires, demands and
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