A Model of Political Competition with Citizen-Candidates

@article{Osborne1996AMO,
  title={A Model of Political Competition with Citizen-Candidates},
  author={Martin J. Osborne and Al Slivinski},
  journal={Quarterly Journal of Economics},
  year={1996},
  volume={111},
  pages={65-96}
}
We develop a model of electoral competition in which citizens choose whether or not to run as candidates. A winner implements her favorite policy. The equilibrium number of candidates depends negatively on the cost of running and positively on the benefits of winning. For some parameter values all equilibria under plurality rule have exactly two candidates, whose positions are distinct. Two-candidate elections are more likely under plurality rule than under a runoff system (cf. Duverger's Law… 

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