• Corpus ID: 159168976

A Mean Field Game Of Portfolio Trading And Its Consequences On Perceived Correlations

  title={A Mean Field Game Of Portfolio Trading And Its Consequences On Perceived Correlations},
  author={Charles-Albert Lehalle and Charafeddine Mouzouni},
  journal={arXiv: Trading and Market Microstructure},
This paper goes beyond the optimal trading Mean Field Game model introduced by Pierre Cardaliaguet and Charles-Albert Lehalle in [Cardaliaguet, P. and Lehalle, C.-A., Mean field game of controls and an application to trade crowding, Mathematics and Financial Economics (2018)]. It starts by extending it to portfolios of correlated instruments. This leads to several original contributions: first that hedging strategies naturally stem from optimal liquidation schemes on portfolios. Second we show… 

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