A Lower Bound on the Competitive Ratio of Truthful Auctions

@inproceedings{Goldberg2004ALB,
  title={A Lower Bound on the Competitive Ratio of Truthful Auctions},
  author={Andrew V. Goldberg and Jason D. Hartline and Anna R. Karlin and Michael E. Saks},
  booktitle={STACS},
  year={2004}
}
We study a class of single-round, sealed-bid auctions for a set of identical items. We adopt the worst case competitive framework defined by [6,3] that compares the profit of an auction to that of an optimal single price sale to at least two bidders. In this framework, we give a lower bound of 2.42 (an improvement from the bound of 2 given in [3]) on the competitive ratio of any truthful auction, one where each bidders best strategy is to declare the true maximum value an item is worth to them… CONTINUE READING

Topics from this paper.

Citations

Publications citing this paper.
SHOWING 1-10 OF 13 CITATIONS

Optimal competitive auctions

VIEW 10 EXCERPTS
CITES BACKGROUND, RESULTS & METHODS
HIGHLY INFLUENCED

From optimal limited to unlimited supply auctions

VIEW 10 EXCERPTS
CITES BACKGROUND & METHODS

Averaging Techniques for Competitive Auctions

VIEW 2 EXCERPTS
CITES METHODS
HIGHLY INFLUENCED

Hats, auctions and derandomization

VIEW 2 EXCERPTS
CITES BACKGROUND

Competitive Analysis via Benchmark Decomposition

VIEW 1 EXCERPT

Auction-type framework for selling inter-domain paths

VIEW 1 EXCERPT
CITES BACKGROUND

Optimal Bi-Valued Auctions

VIEW 2 EXCERPTS
CITES BACKGROUND