Corpus ID: 160023310

A Heterogeneous Evolutionarily Stable Population of Moral and Selfish Individuals : Exploring the Diversity of Preferences

@inproceedings{Ayoubi2018AHE,
  title={A Heterogeneous Evolutionarily Stable Population of Moral and Selfish Individuals : Exploring the Diversity of Preferences},
  author={Charles Ayoubi and Boris Thurm},
  year={2018}
}
Why do individuals take different decisions when confronted with similar choices? This paper investigates whether the answer lies in an evolutionary process. Our analysis builds on recent work in evolutionary game theory showing the superiority of a given type of preferences, homo moralis, in fitness games with assortative matching. We adapt the classical definition of evolutionary stability to the case where individuals with distinct preferences coexist in a population. This approach allows us… CONTINUE READING

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