A Geometric Approach to Mechanism Design

  title={A Geometric Approach to Mechanism Design},
  author={Jacob K. Goeree and Alexey Kushnir},
  journal={European Economics: Microeconomics \& Industrial Organization eJournal},
  • J. GoereeAlexey Kushnir
  • Published 5 June 2013
  • Economics
  • European Economics: Microeconomics & Industrial Organization eJournal
We develop a novel geometric approach to mechanism design using an important result in convex analysis: the duality between a closed convex set and its support function. By deriving the support function for the set of feasible interim values we extend the wellknown Maskin-Riley-Matthews-Border conditions for reduced-form auctions to social choice environments. We next refine the support function to include incentive constraints using a geometric characterization of incentive compatibility… 

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