A Generic Approach to Coalition Formation

@article{Apt2007AGA,
  title={A Generic Approach to Coalition Formation},
  author={Krzysztof R. Apt and Andreas Witzel},
  journal={ArXiv},
  year={2007},
  volume={abs/0709.0435}
}
We propose an abstract approach to coalition formation that focuses on simple merge and split rules transforming partitions of a group of players. We identify conditions under which every iteration of these rules yields a unique partition. The main conceptual tool is a specific notion of a stable partition. The results are parametrized by a preference relation between partitions of a group of players and naturally apply to coalitional TU-games, hedonic games and exchange economy games. 

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