A Generalized Strategy Eliminability Criterion and Computational Methods for Applying It

@inproceedings{Conitzer2005AGS,
  title={A Generalized Strategy Eliminability Criterion and Computational Methods for Applying It},
  author={Vincent Conitzer and Tuomas Sandholm},
  booktitle={AAAI},
  year={2005}
}
We define a generalized strategy eliminability criterion for bimatrix games that considers whether a given strategy is eliminable relative to given dominator & eliminee subsets of the players' strategies. We show that this definition spans a spectrum of eliminability criteria from strict dominance (when the sets are as small as possible) to Nash equilibrium (when the sets are as large as possible). We show that checking whether a strategy is eliminable according to this criterion is coNP… CONTINUE READING

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