Corpus ID: 156496442

A Game-theoretical Analysis of China's College Admission Mechanism

@article{Haifeng2007AGA,
  title={A Game-theoretical Analysis of China's College Admission Mechanism},
  author={N. Haifeng},
  journal={China Economic Quarterly},
  year={2007}
}

N. Haifeng

Published 2007

Computer Science

China Economic Quarterly

The College admission mechanism in China is a giant revealing preference game played by millions of students every year. Unfortunately, the true preferences of students are not their optimal equilibrium strategies. We prove that the equilibrium outcome is unique and Pareto efficient, but it is hardly a possible mission for students to coordinate to equilibrium. Fortunately, the admirable Gale-Shapley model of deferred-acceptance mechanism in college admission can be adapted to achieve the same… CONTINUE READING

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