A Further Note on Endogenous Spillovers in a Non-tournament R&D Duopoly

@article{Tesoriere2008AFN,
  title={A Further Note on Endogenous Spillovers in a Non-tournament R&D Duopoly},
  author={Antonio Tesoriere},
  journal={Review of Industrial Organization},
  year={2008},
  volume={33},
  pages={177-184}
}
This note considers the paper of Poyago-Theotoky (1999) on strategic R&D with endogenous spillovers. It proves through an example that, under R&D collusion, optimality sometimes requires either minimal or asymmetric spillovers. It also provides a simple sufficient condition for optimal spillovers between colluding firms to involve maximal spillovers (i.e., complete sharing of information).