A Further Note on Endogenous Spillovers in a Non-tournament R&D Duopoly

  title={A Further Note on Endogenous Spillovers in a Non-tournament R&D Duopoly},
  author={A. Tesoriere},
  journal={Review of Industrial Organization},
  • A. Tesoriere
  • Published 2008
  • Economics
  • Review of Industrial Organization
  • This note considers the paper of Poyago-Theotoky (1999) on strategic R&D with endogenous spillovers. It proves through an example that, under R&D collusion, optimality sometimes requires either minimal or asymmetric spillovers. It also provides a simple sufficient condition for optimal spillovers between colluding firms to involve maximal spillovers (i.e., complete sharing of information). 
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    A Note on Endogenous Spillovers in a Non-Tournament R & D Duopoly
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