A Forward/reverse Auction Algorithm for Asymmetric Assignment Problems1

Abstract

In this paper we consider the asymmetric assignment problem and we propose a new auction algorithm for its solution. The algorithm uses in a novel way the recently proposed idea of reverse auction, where in addition to persons bidding for objects by raising their prices, we also have objects competing for persons by essentially offering discounts. In practice, the new algorithm apparently deals better with price wars than the currently existing auction algorithms. As a result it frequently does not require 2-scaling for good practical performance, and tends to terminate substantially (and often dramatically) faster than its competitors. 1 This work was supported in part by NSF under Grant CCR-9108058, and in part by the BM/C3 Technology branch of the United States Army Strategic Defense Command. It will be published also by the Journal of Computational Optimization and its Applications. 2 Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, M. I. T., Cambridge, Mass., 02139. 3 Department of Electrical Engineering, Boston University, and ALPHATECH, Inc., Burlington, Mass., 01803. 1

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@inproceedings{Bertsekas1993AFA, title={A Forward/reverse Auction Algorithm for Asymmetric Assignment Problems1}, author={Dimitri P. Bertsekas and David A. Casta{\~n}{\'o}n}, year={1993} }