A Formal Foundation for Secure Remote Execution of Enclaves

@article{Subramanyan2017AFF,
  title={A Formal Foundation for Secure Remote Execution of Enclaves},
  author={Pramod Subramanyan and Rohit Sinha and Ilia A. Lebedev and Srinivas Devadas and Sanjit A. Seshia},
  journal={IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive},
  year={2017},
  volume={2017},
  pages={565}
}
Recent proposals for trusted hardware platforms, such as Intel SGX and the MIT Sanctum processor, offer compelling security features but lack formal guarantees. We introduce a verification methodology based on a trusted abstract platform (TAP), a formalization of idealized enclave platforms along with a parameterized adversary. We also formalize the notion of secure remote execution and present machine-checked proofs showing that the TAP satisfies the three key security properties that entail… CONTINUE READING

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