Corpus ID: 53664288

A Formal Analysis of 5 G Authentication

@inproceedings{Basin2018AFA,
  title={A Formal Analysis of 5 G Authentication},
  author={David Basin and Jannik Dreier and Lucca Hirschi and S. Radomirovic and R. Sasse and Vincent Stettler},
  year={2018}
}
  • David Basin, Jannik Dreier, +3 authors Vincent Stettler
  • Published 2018
  • Mobile communication networks connect much of the world’s population. The security of users’ calls, SMSs, and mobile data depends on the guarantees provided by the Authenticated Key Exchange protocols used. For the next-generation network (5G), the 3GPP group has standardized the 5G AKA protocol for this purpose. We provide the first comprehensive formal model of a protocol from the AKA family: 5GAKA.We also extract precise requirements from the 3GPP standards defining 5G and we identify… CONTINUE READING

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